China, US Could Go to Nuclear War Over Chinese Invasion of Taiwan, War Game Finds

Summary:

A recent war game simulation conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and a war gaming lab at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) revealed that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan could potentially lead to a nuclear conflict between China and the United States. The exercise, which envisioned an amphibious invasion by China's communist regime in 2028, highlighted the grave consequences and complexities of such a scenario.

The simulation played out 15 different iterations, starting with conventional weapons but allowing teams to escalate to nuclear options. In eight of these cases, nuclear weapons were used, with Chinese teams opting for nuclear strikes in the first seven instances. According to Mark Cancian, the report's coauthor and senior adviser at CSIS, nuclear weapons came into play when either side perceived a catastrophic defeat in conventional warfare.

The outcomes of the war game varied significantly, resulting in five different scenarios. These included a cease-fire with Chinese forces withdrawing, the establishment of a Chinese enclave in Taiwan, the destruction of Chinese troops on the island with Taiwan refraining from declaring formal independence, a general nuclear war causing hundreds of millions of casualties, and the absence of any cease-fire or nuclear escalation.

This war game serves as an update to a previous CSIS simulation from January 2023, which did not include nuclear weapons. That earlier exercise concluded that while the United States and Taiwan could repel a Chinese invasion, it would come at a great cost in terms of lives and material.

The CCP's claim over Taiwan, despite having never ruled the island, remains a central issue. Taiwan operates as a de facto independent country with its own democratic government, military, and constitution. The report suggests that if China were to establish an enclave in Taiwan, it could potentially build up forces and resources in the area, possibly leading to a coercive takeover of the entire island.

Eric Heginbotham, another coauthor and principal research scientist at MIT, noted that China's initial nuclear strikes targeted operational sites in Taiwan. Different U.S. responses to these strikes led to varied outcomes. Continued U.S. conventional warfare typically resulted in further Chinese nuclear use, while U.S. nuclear strikes on Chinese cities escalated to a general nuclear war.

A key takeaway from the simulation was the limited utility of the U.S. nuclear advantage in deterring China or in nuclear bargaining. Heginbotham emphasized the need for the U.S. to execute current nuclear modernization plans, but also pointed out that expanding the arsenal beyond this might not offer decisive leverage in a conflict with China.

The U.S. is currently modernizing its nuclear capabilities, replacing the aging Minuteman III missiles with the new LGM-35A Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missiles and planning to acquire at least 100 new B-21 Raider stealth bombers. Meanwhile, China is aggressively building its nuclear arsenal, with the Pentagon estimating it could have over 1,000 warheads by 2030.

The report also recommends developing "face-saving off-ramps" for both sides to avoid a nuclear conflict. These off-ramps could involve allowing China to evacuate isolated soldiers rather than forcing them to surrender, thereby achieving U.S. objectives while providing a means for China to exit the conflict without losing face.

The findings of this war game underscore the severe risks and uncertainties involved in a potential conflict over Taiwan. They highlight the importance of strategic planning and diplomatic efforts to prevent escalation and ensure stability in the region.